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Ugly American
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MAJ. GEN. EDWARD G. LANSDALE
TO GO TO SOUTH VIETNAM

(Mr. PEPPER (at the request of Mr. ROOSEVELT) was granted permission to extend his remarks at this point in the RECORD and to include extraneous matter.)

Mr. PEPPER. Mr. Speaker, I am exceedingly pleased to see that Maj. Gen. Edward G. Lansdale is being sent to South Vietnam as a special assistant to Ambassador Henry Cabot Lodge. I include the announcement in the Washington Post of August 20 as a part of my remarks.

General Lansdale's appointment is being regarded—and properly so, I think—as a clear indication of President Johnson's desire to meet the challenge of Communist subversion and aggression on the political front as well as on the military front. I share his hope that the military situation will improve as rapidly as possible so that more and more emphasis can be given to the political struggle in Vietnam—to the contest for the allegiance of the individual Vietnamese citizen.

It is also my hope, Mr. Speaker, that we will push the political initiative outside of Vietnam—in the rest of southeast Asia, in Africa, and in Latin America. I believe we could find a nation in each of these areas whose leaders would be willing to have our help in moving rapidly toward social justice and a broadly based economic prosperity. Such a country, with our aid, could become a showcase of progress, an example and a challenge to the leaders and people of surrounding countries. And such an example in another country in southeast Asia could have a profoundly favorable effect on the course of the struggle in South Vietnam, by showing the people of that area what the United States could help them accomplish once the Vietcong were rejected militarily and politically.

We need not wait for military action to create a new environment for such an initiative in another southeast Asian country. We can expand our political offensive against communism now and I think we should be as willing to support this effort financially as we are to provide whatever may be necessary in the way of funds to support our military effort.

LANSDALE TO VIETNAM: STRESSES A POLITICAL SOLUTION

(By Stanley Karnow)

The administration has appointed Maj. Gen. Edward G. Lansdale as special assistant to Ambassador Henry Cabot Lodge at Saigon in what is regarded here as a reflection of growing concern that the U.S. approach to Vietnam has become too militarized and too Americanized.

An unorthodox and controversial figure, Lansdale is to aim broadly at essential political, social, economic, and psychological factors that, many specialists feel, have been neglected in the recent American buildup in Vietnam.

"In several ways we're missing the point out there," a source close to Lansdale claims. "The Communists are waging revolution in all its dimensions, while our side is merely fighting a war."

TO SEEK CLOSER BONDS

One of Lansdale's initial efforts after his arrival in Vietnam next week will be to establish closer bonds between Vietnamese leaders both in Saigon and in the countryside.

Ties with the Vietnamese were thin during the tenure of former Ambassador Maxwell Taylor, whose mission tended to plan programs without consulting local authorities.

Lansdale is said to believe that little progress can be achieved, particularly in the political realm, unless a sense of trust is restored between Americans and Vietnamese.

He will also strive to contact Vietnam's wide variety of political and religious factions in hope of helping them find some common ground for unity.

TO BUILD UP RED FOES

Some analysts submit that Lansdale's longer-term objective is to strengthen anti-Communist elements should future negotiations prescribe elections in Vietnam. The Geneva Accord of 1954 scheduled nationwide elections, which were postponed, largely because anti-Communist forces felt too weak to contest them.

To assist in his operation, Lansdale has recruited a "political action team" comprising a dozen specialists. Like Lansdale himself, some fought the Communist-led Huk rebels in the Philippines in the early 1950's. Others include officials of the U.S. Information Agency, Pentagon, and Central Intelligence Agency.

One member dates his familiarity with Vietnam back to World War II, when he parachuted into the area to help form an anti-Japanese guerrilla force. On and off he served in Vietnam until September 1964, when he was dismissed by Admiral Taylor for what was unofficially described as "unconventional conduct" in the line of duty.

Commenting on that dismissal at the time, one U.S. official in Saigon said: "We don't want Lawrences of Asia."

Like Col. T. E. Lawrence, who rallied the Arabs to the Allied cause in World War I, Lansdale has inspired admiration, ridicule—and above all, controversy.

As a CIA operative in Saigon in 1954, he backed Vietnamese President Ngo Dinh Diem against President Eisenhower's special representative, Gen. J. Lawton Collins, who favored a coalition of Vietnamese leaders.

In their transparently fictitious novel, William Burdick and William Lederer depicted Lansdale as a sensitive, selfless "Ugly American" who sympathized with Asian aspirations. However, British author Graham Greene personified him as a naively idealistic "Quiet American."

Early in 1961, President Kennedy sent Lansdale back to South Vietnam to assess the growing insurgency there. Lansdale returned considerably disillusioned by the Diem regime's incapacity to motivate and mobilize its people.

Lansdale believed that U.S. involvement in Vietnam had to stress political and social activities to win popular support. This view was particularly contested in the Pentagon by officials who argued: "Let's fight first and worry about politics later."

Sharp disagreements led to Lansdale's retirement in 1961. In recent years he has publicly criticized U.S. policy in Vietnam, reiterating his theme that military action alone cannot improve the situation.

REVOLUTIONARY IDEA

Writing in Foreign Affairs last October, for example, he expressed doubt that bombings of the kind now carried out in South and North Vietnam would be effective. He wrote: "The Communists have let loose a revolutionary idea in Vietnam, and it will not die."

by being ignored, bombed or smothered by us."

These strong opinions reportedly irritated Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara and his military advisers. It is understood that they opposed Lansdale's present assignment to Saigon but were overruled by President Johnson.

Lansdale's views, however, caught the attention of several legislators, among them Senator Thomas Dodd, Democrat, of Connecticut. Early this year he proposed to the President that Lansdale and other experienced Americans be sent to Saigon to establish liaison with the Vietnamese Army, Buddhists, intellectuals, and local leaders.

Acting on that counsel, President Johnson instructed Ambassador Lodge to include Lansdale in his mission. As far as is known, Vietnamese leaders were not consulted on Lansdale's appointment.

Americans familiar with the stresses within the U.S. mission in Saigon believe that Lansdale's unorthodox manner may incur the opposition of certain American officers in Vietnam.

A far greater worry—said to disturb Lansdale as well—is that he may be expected to perform miracles in Vietnam. "If he doesn't produce a miracle," says one U.S. official, "his friends will be disappointed and his enemies delighted."

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